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AGRICULTURE AND ECOSYSTEM
SERVICES: STRATEGIES FOR STATE
AND LOCAL GOVERNMENTS
J.B. RUHL*
INTRODUCTION
This Article focuses on hints of movement in a new direction
for agriculture. The impetus comes not primarily from the federal
government, but arises, ironically, out of a merger between the
age-old practice of paying farmers to do what is right, the fear of
losing agricultural lands to suburban development, the rising fiscal
burdens to state and local jurisdictions presented by new suburban
development, and the new understanding that farms may hold
tremendous untapped value as providers of ecosystem services to
local, regional, and national communities. The goal in this new
policy movement is to unlock the multifunctional capacity of
farms to contribute to the environmental and economic wellbeing
of the landscape while continuing to serve as our primary source of
food and fiber, and it is playing out with promise at the state and
local level.'
One might think implementing this win-win for agriculture
* Visiting Professor (Spring 2008), Harvard Law School; Matthews &
Hawkins Professor of Property, The Florida State University College of Law,
Tallahassee, Florida. I am indebted to Jon Cannon, Steven Eagle, Steven Kraft,
David Schoenbrod, Richard Stewart, Katrina Wyman, participants in the NYU
Law School's Spring 2008 Breaking the Logjam symposium, and students in the
NYU Law School Fall 2007 Environmental Law Seminar and the Harvard Law
School Spring 2008 Seminar on the Law and Policy of Ecosystem Services for
helpful input on this project. Vicki Shiah, Harvard Class of 2009, provided
valuable research assistance and comments. All positions taken and errors made
are mine. Please direct any questions or comments to me at jruhl@law.fsu.edu.
The development of farm multifunctionality policy began in earnest with
the European Union's Agenda 2000 reforms of the Common Agricultural Policy.
See Thomas L. Dobbs & Jules N. Pretty, Agri-Environmental Stewardship
Schemes and "Multifunctionality", 26 REV. OF AGRIC. ECON. 220 (2004).
Extensive background and evaluation of the topic can be found in ORG. FOR
ECONOMIC Co-OPERATION & DEVELOPMENT, MULTIFUNCTIONALITY: TOWARDS
AN ANALYTICAL FRAMEWORK (2001) [hereinafter OECD].
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and the environment is a policy "no-brainer," but agriculture has
long been the Rubik's Cube of environmental policy. Although
agriculture is a leading cause of pollution and other environmental
harms,2 it has been resistant to regulation and, for the most part,
remarkably successful at being paid to do the right thing.3 While
other industries have advanced to flexible, market-based "second
generation" environmental policies and beyond, agriculture
somehow keeps dodging the bullet.4 Federal and state agencies
have tried to overlay small pieces of conventional regulation on
farms, which farm interests have resisted at every turn,5 and
Congress opens debate on Farm Bills every few years with
promises of innovative policy reform, only to drift back into
business as usual.6 Seldom has so much time, money, and energy
been expended year after year, decade upon decade, to keep policy
of any other kind exactly where it started out. Agricultural
economist David Freshwater sums up this history well:
2 For an inventory of environmental harms agriculture has caused and is
continuing to cause in the United States, see J.B. Ruh], Farms, Their
Environmental Harms, and Environmental Law, 27 ECOLOGY L.Q. 263, 272-92
(2000) [hereinafter Ruhl, Farms]. The trend is not abating as "recent scientific
assessments have alerted the world to the increasing size of agriculture's
footprint, including its contribution to climate change and degradation of natural
resources." E. Toby Kiers et al., Agriculture at a Crossroads, 320 SCIENCE 320,
320 (2008).
3 For a survey of this policy failure, describing the "safe harbor" agriculture
enjoys from environmental regulation and the subsidy programs that pay farms to
meet minimal baseline standards other industries are mandated to achieve, see
Ruhl, Farms, supra note 2, at 293-316, 325-27. See also J.B. Ruhl, Three
Questions for Agriculture About the Environment, 17 J. LAND USE & ENVTL. L.
395, 404-05 (2002); J.B. Ruhl, Farmland Stewardship: Can Ecosystems Stand
Any More oflt?, 9 WASH. U. J.L. & POL'Y 1 (2002).
4 Agriculture "never had coherent first-generation environmental protection
programs" and "no significant environmental controls have been placed on farm
practices even where agricultural activities are a primary cause of pollution
problems." C. Ford Runge, Environmental Protection from Farm to Market, in
THINKING ECOLOGICALLY: THE NEXT GENERATION OF ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY
200, 200-01 (Marian R. Chertow & Daniel C. Esty eds., 1997); see also Ruhl,
Farms, supra note 2, at 268 n.6.
5 I cover several examples of regulatory controls on agriculture, including
regulation of concentrated animal feeding operations under the Clean Water Act
and regulation of habitat disturbance under the Endangered Species Act, in Ruhl,
Farms, supra note 2, at 316-27.
6 For a thorough examination of Farm Bill politics, see WOODS INST. FOR
THE ENV'T., U.S. AGRICULTURAL POLICY AND THE 2007 FARM BILL (Kaush Arha
et al., eds., 2007), available at http://woods.stanford.edu/docs/farmbill/
farmbillbook.pdf [hereinafter 2007 FARM BILL].
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With each farm bill cycle there are calls for a major rethinking
of U.S. farm policy to make it better suit current farm
conditions and the expectations of the broader American public
about the roles of agriculture. These calls for reform have been
for the most part unsuccessful because there has been no
argument compelling enough to overcome advocates of the
status quo. But as time passes the wisdom of maintaining a set
of policies that have their basis in the 1930s and were designed
to support a structure of agriculture that no longer exists
becomes more questionable.
Paying farmers to do the "right thing" environmentally has
been a theme of federal farm policy for decades, embodied in
programs such as the Conservation Reserve Program (CRP), which
pays farmers to take land out of production for defined periods to
enhance its conservation values, and the Conservation Security
Program (CSP) and Environmental Quality Incentives Program
(EQIP), which pay farmers to employ better practices on working
lands.8 And either paying or forcing farmers to preserve
agricultural land uses at the urban fringe has become a primary
driver of state and local land use policy.9 In this sense farms have
long been understood as land units that have the capacity to
contribute to environmental and cultural values.
In -recent years, however, ecologists and economists focusing
on agriculture have forged a more complete vision of the capacity
of agricultural lands. They see farms as housing the natural capital
capable of providing a stream of diverse good and services,
including ecosystem services such as increased biodiversity,
carbon sequestration, pollination, groundwater recharge, and
improvement of water quality.10 To be sure, farms taking this
7 David Freshwater, Applying Multifunctionality to U.S. Farm Policy I
(Univ. of Ky., Econ. Staff Paper No. 437, 2002) (unpublished manuscript on file
with author), available at http://www.uky.edu/Ag/AgEcon/pubs/staff/staff437.pdf.
8 For a thorough review of agricultural land retirement and working land
conservation subsidy programs, see Craig Cox, US. Agriculture Conservation
Policy & Programs: History, Trends, and Implications, in 2007 FARM BILL,
supra note 6, at 113.
9 For a comprehensive overview of this state and local land use regulation
trend, see JULIAN CONRAD JUERGENSMEYER & THOMAS E. ROBERTS, LAND USE
PLANNING AND DEVELOPMENT REGULATION LAW 815-71 (2d ed. 2007).
10 Ecosystem services are economically valuable benefits humans derive
from ecological resources directly, such as storm surge mitigation provided by
coastal dunes and marshes, and indirectly, such as nutrient cycling that supports
crop production. Natural capital consists of the ecological resources that produce
Imaged with Permission from N.Y.U. Environmental Law Journal
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working landscape model to heart would look and behave
differently from conventional operations based on intensive
monoculture crops and concentrated livestock, but they
unmistakably would be active and potentially prosperous
agricultural operations. Hence it is no exaggeration to suggest that
"the scientific and political planets are aligning to create both the
demand for policy-relevant research into the [ecosystem services]
available from agriculture and the means to create incentives for
farmers to provide those services.""a
Unfortunately, federal policy has been slow to move in this
direction. While it has become a rite of passage to begin each five-
year cycle of Farm Bill work with great fanfare over the prospect
of stepping up the "green subsidy" and farm preservation
programs, the rhetoric and content each time are steadily watered
down until the programs look about as they started. The long
prevailing system of farm income supports, including green
subsidies, simply do not tap into or promote a sense that there is
more to agriculture than supplying food, fiber, and energy
commodities and a dose of cultural nostalgia.
12
It is unlikely, therefore, that federal farm policy alone will
align these interests. It will be important for farm
multifunctionality to respond to demand-driven signals, whereas
these service values, such as forests, riparian habitat, and wetlands. For
descriptions of natural capital and ecosystem services, see MILLENNIUM
ECOSYSTEM ASSESSMENT, ECOSYSTEMS AND HUMAN WELL-BEING: SYNTHESIS
(2005), available at http://www.milleniumassessment.org/documents/
document.356.aspx.pdf; NATURE'S SERVICES: SOCIETAL DEPENDENCE ON
NATURAL ECOSYSTEMS (Gretchen C. Daily ed. 1997); Robert Costanza et al., The
Value of the World's Ecosystem Services and Natural Capital, 387 NATURE 253
(1997). For coverage of the emergence of the ecosystem services concept in law
and policy, see J.B. RUHL, STEVEN E. KRAFT & CHRISTOPHER L. LANT, THE LAW
AND POLICY OF ECOSYSTEM SERVICES (2007); James Salzman, A Field of Green?
The Past and Future of Ecosystem Services, 21 J. LAND USE AND ENVTL. L. 133
(2006); J.B. Ruhl & James Salzman, The Law and Policy Beginnings of
Ecosystem Services, 22 J. LAND USE & ENVTL. L. 157 (2007).
11 Scott M. Swinton et al., Ecosystem Services from Agriculture: Looking
Beyond the Usual Suspects, 88 AMER. J. AGRIC. ECON. 1160, 1164 (2006). An
excellent survey of the literature supporting this movement is found at G. Philip
Robertson & Scott M. Swinton, Reconciling Agricultural Productivity and
Environmental Integrity: A Grand Challenge for Agriculture, 3 FRONTIERS IN
ECOLOGY AND THE ENV'T 38 (2005).
12 See David Abler, Multifunctionality, Agricultural Policy, and
Environmental Policy, 33 AGRIC. & RESOURCE ECON. REV. 8 (2004); Katherine
R. Smith, Public Payments for Environmental Services from Agriculture:
Precedents and Possibilities, 88 AM. J. AGRIC. ECON. 1167, 1167-68 (2006).
Imaged with Permission from N.Y.U. Environmental Law Journal
2008]
HeinOnline  -- 17 N.Y.U. Envtl. L.J. 427 2008-2009
N. Y. U. ENVIRONMENTAL LAW JOURNAL
even the green subsidy component of federal farm policy is supply-
driven and tailored to what is possible and convenient for
conventional agriculture.
These land retirement, working lands, and land use preservation
programs' payment priorities are agriculture-centric. They are
based on what the producers of the agri-environmental benefits
can supply, rather than what is necessarily demanded by the
population that would benefit from ensuing environmental
service enhancement.... [T]he choice of how benefits are
targeted derives from a universe of acreage-based attributes; in
other words, what existing, independent farm production
facilities can supply .... There is no good evidence that any
existing public agri-environmental payment program purchases
a given 'environmental service.' 13
With little prospect of the Farm Bill moving off this
position,1 4 it is time to consider how state and local governments
can become more active in bringing about farm multifunctionality
and how the federal government can help them. That is the focus
of this Article. It explores the emerging theme of farms as
multifunctional land uses and suggests that state and local
governments can best help ground it through flexible, efficient
policy instruments. The message for Congress is to realign federal
farm policy to facilitate the delivery of a more sustainable profile
of farm goods and services through state and local programs.
Although federal farm subsidy programs surely could be
repositioned to better promote farm multifunctionality directly,'
5
the benefits of multifunctional agricultural production, compared
to the conventional commodity production orientation, are
primarily local.
On this policy front, therefore, I propose that federal policy
support state and local innovations rather than dominate the field
as has been the case historically. In Part I of the Article I examine
13 Smith, supra note 12, at 1167-68.
14 The 2008 Farm Bill, popularly known as the Food, Conservation, and
Energy Act of 2008, did not alter the structural features of the green subsidy
programs. Farm, Nutrition, and Bioenergy Act of 2007, H.R. 2419, 110th Cong.
(2007).
"5 For a discussion of how federal "green subsidy" farm payments could be
reconfigured to promote farms multifunctionality, see Kaush Arha et al.,
Conserving Ecosystem Services Across Agrarian Landscapes, in 2007 FARM
BILL, supra note 6, at 207; William J. Even, Green Payments: The Next
Generation of U.S. Farm Programs?, 10 DRAKE J. AGRIC. L. 173 (2005).
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the theme of farms as multifunctional production units as it is
developing in ecological literature, then examine the potential
future scenarios of agricultural land uses and the tools state and
local policy could use to help break the logjam of agriculture-
environment policy by promoting the multifunctionality of farms.
Part II of the Article then uses two case studies from Florida to
focus on two such tools in particular-payments for ecosystem
services (PES) and transferable development rights (TDR).
The PES approach is predicated on the opportunity for state
and local governments to reduce infrastructure spending associated
with residential and commercial development, such as the need for
increased water supply and maintaining water quality, by paying
agricultural operations directly to deliver equivalents at lower cost
in the form of ecosystem services. 6 Although PES programs
defined broadly include conventional green subsidy programs such
as the CRP, as well as payments for environmental amenities, such
as conservation of endangered species habitat, that generate
incidental ecosystem service benefits, ideally payments would be
based on demand-driven, market-priced transactions.' 7
The TDR is a technique well-known in land use law' 8 and
gaining traction in agriculture policy as a means of preventing
farmland from being devoured by the suburban amoeba. 19 TDRs,
16 For general background on PES programs, see B. Kelsey Jack, Carolyn
Kousky & Katherine R.E. Sims, Designing Payments for Ecosystem Services:
Lessons from Previous Experience with Incentive-Based Mechanisms, 105
PROCEEDINGS OF THE NAT'L ACAD. OF SCI. 9465 (2008). For discussion of
specific PES initiatives, mainly from other nations, see James Salzman, Creating
Markets for Ecosystem Services: Notes from the Field, 80 N.Y.U. L. REv. 870
(2005); Brian C. Steed, Government Payments for Ecosystem Services-Lessons
from Costa Rica, 23 J. LAND USE & ENVTL. L. 177 (2007).
17 Indeed, some advocates of PES programs in agricultural settings
emphasize this feature to differentiate PES programs from subsidy programs.
See, e.g., JOHN M. ANTLE, PAYMENTS FOR ECOSYSTEM SERVICES AND U.S. FARM
POLICY 17 (Am. Enter. Inst. Forum on The 2007 Farm Bill and Beyond,
Working Paper, 2006), available at http://www.aei.org/docLib/
20070515_antlefinal.pdf.
18 See JUERGENSMEYER & ROBERTS, supra note 9, § 9.10, at 546 (TDR
"programs are frequently incorporated into growth management programs");
Julian Conrad Juergensmeyer, James C. Nicholas & Brian D. Leebrick,
Transferable Development Rights and Alternatives After Suitum, 30 URB. LAW.
441 (1998) (surveying several prominent programs).
'9 For surveys of the use of TDRs in agricultural land policy, see Elisa
Paster, Preservation of Agricultural Lands Through Land Use Planning Tools
and Techniques, 44 NAT. RESOURCES J. 283, 306-08 (2004); Edward Thompson,
Jr., "Hybrid" Farmland Protection Programs: A New Paradigm for Growth
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which have a long history in local historic preservation 2° and
environmental protection 21 programs, are a way of rewarding a
landowner for foregoing development (either voluntarily or by
regulatory force) in one area (the "sending area") by providing a
density or other development "credit" that can be applied to exceed
the default development limits in another area (the "receiving
area").
Although distinct in several ways, including fiscal impact, the
role of regulation, and the medium through which provision of
ecosystem services is rewarded, these two approaches share design
issues being worked out in two newly-initiated programs in
Florida, as summarized in Part II. It is the funding and promotion
of this kind of state and local programs I envision as becoming a
focal point of federal policy.
I. PROMOTING FARM MULTIFUNCTIONALITY THROUGH STATE AND
LOCAL LAND USE POLICY
The vision of agriculture has vacillated in the public eye over
time. As Swinton et al. explain, in the mid-1800s George Perkins
Marsh revealed the opportunity costs of conversion of natural
habitat to agriculture in his epic book, Man and Nature;22 yet Aldo
Leopold's equally influential Sand County Almanac23 later offered
a "poetic evocation of agriculture as part of a larger ecosystem
community."24 Rachel Carson's 1962 classic, Silent Spring,25 then
returned "scientific and public attention to the negative
externalities of farming., 26 Yet "if the harbinger of the last
intellectual wave to wash over agriculture was Silent Spring, the
bellwether of the next wave may be Nature's Services, edited by
Gretchen Daily., 27 Published in 1997, Nature's Services28 was the
Management?, 23 WM. & MARY ENVTL. L. & POL'Y REv. 831 (1999).
20 See, e.g., Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104
(1978).
21 See, e.g., Suitum v. Tahoe Reg' Planning Agency, 520 U.S. 725, 728-32
(1997).
22 See generally GEORGE PERKINS MARSH, MAN AND NATURE (David
Lowenthal ed., Univ. Wash. Press 2003) (1864).
23 See generally ALDO LEOPOLD, A SAND COUNTY ALMANAC (Oxford Univ.
Press 2001) (1949)
14 Swinton et al., supra note 11, at 1161.
2' RACHEL CARSON, SILENT SPRING (Houghton Mifflin 1994) (1962).26 Swinton et al., supra note 11, at 1161.
27 Id.
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first comprehensive treatment of the ecosystem services concept
grounded in practical ecological foundations. It quickly became
the impetus for a broad movement toward integrating ecological
economics and ecology across a spectrum of policy fronts. One
emerging focal point of the new intellectual wave is the concept of
farm multifunctionality.
A. The Emerging Vision of Farm Multifunctionality
Following the lead of Nature's Services, the growing science
and policy literature on ecosystem services divides them into five
types: provisioning services that underlie the production of
commodities; regulating services that moderate dynamic natural
phenomena; cultural services that provide human psychic
satisfaction; preserving services that maintain ecological diversity
and resilience, and supporting services that promote the capacity
of ecosystems to produce the other service types.29 The story of
conventional crop and livestock agriculture has been largely one of
managing provisioning (food and fiber) and cultural (farmland
character) services and their associated supporting services,
primarily because these are essential for farms to produce
marketable commodities and retain their charmed status in the
public eye. Only recently has the focus turned to expanding
agriculture's position as a source of regulating services valuable to
surrounding local, regional, and national communities, the problem
being how to provide farmers the incentive to manage for such
services when no market yet exists for them. As Swinton et al.
explain:
Agriculture (including planted forests) conventionally supplies
food, fiber, and fuel-'provisioning services' in [ecosystem
services] parlance. Farmers also help maintain the natural
'supporting' [ecosystem services] that make agriculture
productive, such as pollination, biological pest regulation, and
soil nutrient renewal. In theory, the same managed ecosystems
that provide these marketed products could produce other types
of [ecosystem services] if suitable incentives existed. The broad
class of 'regulation [ecosystem services]' covers climate
regulation, water purity, surface water flows, groundwater
28 See NATURE'S SERVICES, supra note 10.
29 See MILLENNIUM ECOSYSTEM ASSESSMENT, ECOSYSTEMS AND HUMAN.
WELL-BEING: A FRAMEWORK FOR ASSESSMENT 57 (2003), available at
http://www.millenniumassessment.org/en/Framework.aspx.
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levels, and waste absorption and breakdown. All of these offer
benefits that are poorly captured by current markets, yet which
managed agricultural and forest ecosystems could potentially
provide.
30
The problem, however, goes well beyond how services could
be captured in markets. Jordan et al. explain that agricultural
"research and development.. .and policy have focused on
maximizing biomass production and optimizing its use, with far
less emphasis on evaluation of environmental, social, and
economic performance.' Similarly, "current federal programs
and policy on environmental quality in agricultural landscapes
mainly subsidize retirement of land from active production.,
32
By contrast, agricultural multifunctionality emphasizes "the
joint production of standard commodities (e.g., food or fiber) and
'ecological services' on the premise that "major additional gains
may result from a 'working landscape' approach that improves
environmental performance of active farmland by rewarding
farmers for delivering environmental benefits, as well as food and
biomass." 33 Methods a multifunctional farm would use to achieve
this more balanced production profile would include precision
farming, no-till farming, organic farming, rotational cropping, crop
residue usage, bio-pest controls, riparian cover, filter strips,
contour farming, incorporated pollinator habitat, and water
retention and recharge ponds. 34 The following chart illustrates the
different ecosystem service production profiles of conventional
and multifunctional agricultural land uses:
30 Swinton et al., supra note 11, at 1160 (citation omitted).
31 N. Jordan et al., Sustainable Development of the Agricultural Bio-
Economy, 316 SCIENCE 1570, 1570 (2007) (footnotes omitted).
32 Id.
33 Id. (footnote omitted).
34 See Rebecca L. Goldman, Barton H. Thompson & Gretchen C. Daily,
Managing for Ecosystem Services on U.S. Agricultural Lands, in 2007 FARM
BILL, supra note 6, at 97, 106.
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Ecosystem Service Type Conventional Farming Multifunctional Farming
Provisioning-food, fiber, -Land and resources are Food, fiber, and fuel production
energy sources, managed primarily to produce remain a primary purpose of land
pharmaceuticals, and other food and fiber commodities and resource management
consumed commodities and, increasingly, biomass fuels
supplied by nature
Regulating-services that Land unsuitable for cultivation Riparian habitat is actively
modulate ecosystem or grazing and land taken out of managed to promote nutrient and
processes with economic production through CRP and sediment capture, provide flood
relevance to humans, such as other subsidy programs will control, and provide thermal
gas composition, air and provide incidental regulating regulation of stream flows;
water temperature, nutrient service benefits; land in interior wetland areas are
flows, and waste cultivation and active grazing managed to promote groundwater
decomposition has diminished capacity to recharge and suppress dry freeze
provide regulating services effects; woody and grassy
biomass is managed for carbon
sequestration
Cultural-services that Active farmlands are devoted Active farmlands could be
enhance human use and primarily to food and fiber opened to public cultural
appreciation of natural production and not generally activities such as stay-and-work,
resources and the built open to public; existence of school visits, or bed-and-
environment, including fanning lands in community breakfast; areas managed for
recreation, aesthetic provides some background regulating and supporting
appreciation, scientific cultural significance services could provide eco-
research, and cultural, tourism, recreational, and
spiritual, and intellectual scientific opportunities
inspiration
Preserving-services that None of significance Areas are actively managed as
maintain ecological seed banks, wildlife habitat, and
resilience and the diversity of to restore native grasses and other
ecological futures vegetation
Supporting-services that Land unsuitable for cultivation Areas are actively managed with
sustain other forms of service or grazing and land .taken out of the specific purpose of enhancing
flows production through CRP and pollination, pest control, seed
other subsidy programs will dispersal, and other supporting
provide incidental supporting services
service benefits such as
pollination, seed dispersal, and
biological pest control; land in
cultivation and active grazing
has diminished capacity
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The problem, of course, is that farmers have no inherent
incentive to move from the conventional model to the
multifunctional model. To put it in economic terms, farmers view
the provision of regulating services to outside communities as a
positive externality-doing so benefits others, but nobody is
willing to pay for the benefits. 35 The market rewards farmers for
producing commodities, and federal farm subsidies force a tradeoff
between commodity production and ecological conservation. Why
is it that farms cannot be rewarded for producing commodities and
ecosystem services?
B. Conceiving Alternative Futures for Agricultural Lands
Even if farming as usual is a superior land use option for a
community as compared to, say, cookie-cutter sprawl, those do
not exhaust the alternatives. Rather, a spectrum of potential future
scenarios presenting different tradeoffs must be considered before
land use policy can make sensible comparisons. For my purposes, I
simplify those additional scenarios to the following four, the
advantages and disadvantages of which are explored in the next
section:
1. Agricultural Use with Increased Environmental
Performance Baseline. Under this scenario, farms are
regulated more heavily than .is the current practice,
primarily to enhance environmental performance. For
example, riparian buffers would be mandated, onsite water
recharge features would be required, and tillage practiced
would be specified. Of course, this is the scenario
agriculture has steadfastly and thus far successfully resisted,
but it is nonetheless an option.
2. Conversion to Multifunctional Working Landscape. Under
this scenario, a baseline performance level of agricultural
practices would first be specified, either at conventional
35 See OECD, supra note 1, at 13; Jules Pretty et al., Policy Challenges and
Priorities for Internalizing the Externalities of Modern Agriculture, 44 J. ENVTL.
PLANNING AND MGMT. 263 (2001). The literature summarizing the economic
incentives associated with ecosystem services, particularly regulating services
that flow from land where natural capital is located and benefits users of other
land parcels, is reviewed in RuHL, KRAFT & LANT, supra note 10, at 57-83.
36 See, e.g., Paster, supra note 19, at 283. ("[P]roductive agricultural lands
are an irreplaceable natural resource being lost to sprawling subdivisions
throughout the country.").
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levels or through regulation at more demanding levels (as
above), and then incentive programs would be designed to
compensate farmers for enhancing the flow of regulating
ecosystem services above the baseline to identified off-farm
populations and areas. For example, if riparian buffers and
onsite recharge features were not required under the
baseline, providing them would entitle a farmer to some
compensatory benefit in return.
3. Conversion to Open Space. Under this scenario, public or
private interests would simply buy out all or substantially all
of the land use rights associated with agricultural lands,
either through conservation easements or fee title. From
there the land management regime might include
management for ecosystem service flows (perhaps even
selling them where markets or other compensatory
incentives can be identified).
4. Conversion to Planned Mixed-Use, Mixed-Density
Development. Under this scenario, agricultural lands are
converted to development, but not as uniform low-density
"sprawl." Rather, either through land use regulation or in
response to market demand, the buildout is
comprehensively planned and includes clustered high-
density development, mixed commercial, office, and
residential uses, and substantial recreational and
conservation open space. Some working agricultural uses
might be retained, and the planning of land use locations
could take into account the location of natural capital and its
associated ecosystem services flows.
Which of the alternative futures is "better" is by no means
obvious. Opening up "the multifunctional set of services provided
by farmland complicates the task of identifying which farmland
should be preserved,, 37 and expanding the alternatives to farming
beyond "sprawl" suggests a spectrum of public trade-offs any one
of which might, in context, be preferable to agriculture. For my
purposes, it is not necessary to decide which of these best fits;
rather, the question is what instruments state and local
37 B. James Deaton, Patricia E. Norris & John P. Hoehn, Setting the
Standards for Farmland Preservation: Do Preservation Criteria Motivate
Citizen Support for Farmland Preservation?, 32 AGRIC. AND RESOURCE ECON.
REv. 272, 272 (2003).
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governments have at their disposal to pursue a multifunctional
agricultural land policy.
C. State and Local Policy Instruments
With the expanded slate of scenarios in hand, state and local
jurisdictions wishing to favor one or another must explore the
policy instruments at their disposal and the advantages and
disadvantages of using particular instruments -to achieve the
desired scenario. This section provides a brief inventory of
methods that state and local jurisdictions can use toward that
objective, followed by an integrated assessment of scenarios and
tools.
Many of the tools are designed to preserve existing farmland
"as is." This "save farming" premise permeates federal and state
policy. The American Farmland Trust (AFT) in particular has been
38a vocal advocate on behalf of farmland conservation. AFT has
been quite successful, helping to bring about the Farmland
Protection Policy Act 39 in the 1981 Farm Bill and a host of
farmland protection measures in the Farm and Ranch Lands
Protection Program40 renewed in the 2002 Farm Bill. But many
38 See AMERICAN FARMLAND TRUST, http://www.farmland.org (last visited
Aug. 8, 2008). Based on National Resources Inventory, the Department of
Agriculture reports that "46 percent of the land converted to urban and built-up
uses comes from cropland and pasture, while 38 and 14 percent comes from
forest land and range land, respectively. Much of the land being lost is prime,
unique, or important farmland located near cities." 7 C.F.R. 1491 (2003). Some
critics have portrayed the farmland preservation movement as an alliance
between agricultural landowners seeking to be paid to keep farming and local
anti-development, pro-open space interests seeking to thwart urban growth. See,
e.g., William A. Fischel, The Urbanization ofAgricultural Land. A Review of the
National Agricultural Lands Study, 58 LAND ECON. 236 (1982); Jesse
Richardson, Farmland Protection, AGRICULTURAL LAW UPDATE, Oct. 2006, at 4.
Nevertheless, many different federal, state, and local programs have been
implemented to respond to AFT's call, and the trend is on the rise. See David C.
Levy & Rachel P. Melliar Smith, The Race for the Future: Farmland
Preservation Tools, 18 NAT. RESOURCES & ENv'T 15, 15 (2003).
'9 See 7 U.S.C. §§ 4201-4209 (2000); 7 C.F.R. § 658.1 (1984). The
legislation requires federal agencies to ensure their respective programs avoid
unnecessarily contributing to the loss of farmlands and to ensure that they act
compatibly with state and local policies designed to protect farmland; no funding
for or regulation of farmland preservation is provided. For a critique of the
legislation as largely ineffective, see Robert M. Ward, The US Farmland
Protection Policy Act: Another Case of Benign Neglect, 8 LAND USE POLICY 63
(1991).
40 See Farm Security and Rural Investment Act of 2002, Pub. L. 107-171 §
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state and local programs are designed to serve the same objective.
For example, one way farmland can be "saved" in this sense
is to configure local zoning regulations to prohibit it from being
converted from agricultural uses, or to impose insurmountable
barriers to converting it to suburban development, a method some
states and localities have used over vociferous objections of the
very landowners ostensibly being protected.4' Whether this status
quo lock-in approach saves farms or saves existing suburbanites
from yet more suburban development is, of course, a matter for
debate and is largely in the eyes of the beholder.42 In any event,
courts have generally rejected the argument that these "exclusive
agricultural use zoning" restrictions constitute regulatory takings.43
Another technique is to use tax policy to favor continuation of
agricultural land uses. 44 For example, many state and local
governments adopt "differential property tax assessment"
provisions that provide lower assessment rates for agricultural land
uses and thereby, in theory, deter conversion to higher rate land
uses. But the evidence is that these measures do not deter
conversion to development at the urban fringe, where returns on
development frequently more than offset the higher tax rates.45
By contrast to the state and local exclusive agricultural use
zoning and tax relief programs, the early thrust of state and local
efforts, later supported by the federal farmland protection
2503 (2002); 7 C.F.R. §. 1491 (2003). The program provides matching funding
to states and local governments to purchase conservation easements from farmers
and ranchers to limit conversion to nonagricultural land uses. See generally
Renee Johnson, CRS Report for Congress, Farm Protection Program: Status and
Current Issues, RS22565 (Jan. 5, 2007); Micheal R. Eitel, The Farm and Ranch
Lands Protection Program: An Analysis of the Federal Policy on United States
Farmland Loss, 8 DRAKE J. AGRIC. L. 591 (2003).
"1 See JUERGENSMEYER & ROBERTS, supra note 9, § 13.8, at 852-55. For a
survey of techniques, including exclusive use zoning, large lot zoning, and
cluster zoning, see Peggy Kirk Hall, Approaches to Zoning that Support and
Protect Agriculture, AGRICULTURAL LAW UPDATE, May 2007, at 6.
42 For a series of articles presenting contrasting perspectives, see Mark W.
Cordes, Takings, Fairness and Farmland Preservation, 60 OHIO STATE L.J. 1033
(1999); Jesse J. Richardson, Jr., Downzoning, Fairness and Farmland
Protection, 19 J. LAND USE & ENVT'L. L 59 (2003); Mark W. Cordes, Fairness
and Farmland Preservation: A Response to Professor Richardson, 20 J. LAND
USE & ENVTL. L. 371 (2005).
43 See, e.g., Gardner v. N.J. Pinelands Comm'n., 593 A.2d 251 (N.J. 1991).
44 See JUERGENSMEYER & ROBERTS, supra note 9, § 13.14, at 866-69.
45 See Sandra A. Hoffman, Note, Farmland and Open Space Preservation in
Michigan: An EmpiricalAnalysis, 19 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 1107 (1986).
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initiative, was funding of programs for purchase of development
rights (PDR) and purchase of agricultural conservation easements
(PACE), the effect being to preclude conversion to more intense
development. For perhaps obvious reasons, AFT has strongly
advocated PDRJPACE programs, with over half the states and 50
local governments adopting such programs and the 2002 Farm Bill
providing $600 million in federal matching dollars for PDR/PACE
acquisitions, as implemented by the USDA's Commodity Credit
Corporation.46
Zoning, tax breaks, and PDR/PACE programs involve either
regulation or public financing. Another alternative for farmland
preservation, one that neither regulates farms directly nor demands
public revenue financing, is the local use of TDRs to reward an
agricultural landowner who withdraws land from potential
conversion to development with "credits" that can be used in other
areas to go above and beyond the baseline of allowable
development parameters, such as density of units. 47 The obvious
attraction to TDRs for purposes of farmland preservation is that
they impose no fiscal burden on the public; on the other hand, the
potential downfall of TDRs is that they depend on developer
demand for the credits.
The techniques mentioned thus far may be useful in
maintaining agricultural land uses in status quo, but they do not
inherently promote better farming practices to reduce
environmental harms or enhance regulating and supporting
services. The chief method of improving the "baseline"
environmental performance of farms has been through the
promulgation of "best management practices" (BMPs), such as
tillage methods, integrated pest management, and retention of
riparian habitat.48 To be comprehensively effective, these would
have to be regulatory mandates, whereas they have been employed
mostly as voluntary guidelines 49 or as the "cross-compliance"
condition to receive subsidies or other incentives.50
46 7 C.F.R. § 1491 (2003).
47 See JUERGENSMEYER & ROBERTS, supra note 9, § 13.11, at 860-62.
48 See David Zaring, Best Practices, 81 N.Y.U. L. REv. 294, 331-34 (2006).
49 See Even, supra note 15, at 180-83; Zaring, supra note 48, at 326-39.
'0 See Sandra S. Batie & Alyson G. Sappington, Cross-Compliance as a Soil
Conservation Strategy: A Case Study, 68 AM. J. AGRIc. EcoN. 880 (1986); Ramu
Govindasamy & Mark J. Cochran, The Conservation Compliance Program and
Best Management Practices: An Integrated Approach for Economic Analysis, 17
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The underlying assumption of this collection of instruments is
that farming remains on the landscape in some substantial form,
whereas some of the alternative scenarios involve removing
agricultural uses altogether. At one extreme, the conversion to
open space can be accomplished through purchase of permanent
conservation easements restricting all but passive uses, or by
acquisition of title with similar deed restrictions. Some state and
local governments, as well as private land trusts, have been
aggressive at accomplishing these land use conversions, though
often some level of agricultural use is contemplated.5' Agricultural
interests have not always been keen about programs designed to
convert agriculture into open space, however, as the concern exists
that the agricultural land base in an area may fall below the
"critical mass" necessary to support a cohesive agricultural
economy including seed and equipment suppliers and produce
distributors.
5 2
At the other conversion extreme, the image AFT and other
"save farming" advocates portray as the inevitable alternative to
farming is conversion to the uniform low-density residential
buildout characteristic of conventional zoning-the scenario most
associated with sprawl--even though mixed-use, mixed-density
planned unit development scenarios are viable options in many
agricultural localities.5 3 At the core of either kind of buildout
scenario is the local zoning power, in these cases exercised not to
restrict agricultural landowners to farming but to liberate them
from it.
Nowhere in the list thus far have ecosystem services been the
central focus. To be sure, agricultural BMPs, though directed
REv. AGRIC. ECON. 369 (1995).
51 See JUERGENSMEYER & ROBERTS, supra note 9, §§ 13.12 to 13.13 at 862-
66. One of the largest such programs in the world is the Florida Forever land
acquisition program, which has put into conservation status over 535,000 acres
of land at a cost of $1.8 billion through December 2006. See FLORIDA
DEPARTMENT OF ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION, FLORIDA FOREVER: PROTECTING
OuR FUTURE, http://www.dep.state.fl.us/lands/acquisition/FloridaForever (last
visited Sept. 24, 2008). In July 2006 the program purchased 74,000 acres of
prime ranching lands in central Florida from the Babcock Ranch, agreeing to
phase out agricultural land uses after 10 years. See Press Release, Florida
Department of Environmental Protection, State of Florida Seals Historic
Purchase of Babcock Ranch (July 31, 2006), available at
http://www.dep.state.fl.us/secretary/news/2006/07/073l_01 .htm.
52 See JUERGENSMEYER & ROBERTS, supra note 9, § 13.5 at 838.
" Seeid. § 13.10 at 857-60.
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primarily at environmental quality, will in many instances
incidentally enhance regulating services, and as discussed below
could even be designed more purposefully for that effect. Indeed,
ecosystem service delivery can be integrated into any of the
described programs as an output goal.
Two instruments in particular have become most closely
associated' with proposals for promoting farm multifunctionality.
One is obvious: pay for enhanced environmental services directly
though PES programs tied to the costs local jurisdictions avoid by
substituting regulating ecosystem services for technological
service infrastructure. Used this way, PES are neither a subsidy nor
a payment for intrinsic or ecological benefits such as endangered
species habitat; rather, they are what the name implies-a demand-
driven payment for a valuable service rendered. In areas where the
development market has put extreme pressure on agricultural
lands, however, PES payment rates may not be adequate to
compete with alternative land uses to preserve agricultural uses. In
that scenario, TDRs, because they tap into development market
values, may provide sufficient incentive to retain some agricultural
land use integrity. Here the TDR credit calculus is not limited to
preservation of farmland or cultural amenities, but includes also
the level of ecosystem service delivery expected from the natural
capital that is secured through altered agricultural practices. Either
instrument, therefore, can promote ecosystem service delivery to
an important, if not driving component of the valuation calculus on
which the PES transfer or TDR credit is based.
Putting it all together, the different future scenario alternatives
and the different policy instruments, with their associated
advantages and disadvantages, can be matched up as shown in the
following chart:
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Future Scenario Policy Tools Advantages Disadvantages
Compete in Land Tax incentives; Maintains agricultural May not compete
Market to Maintain subsidies land uses successfully against
Status Quo high value suburban
Agricultural Use development;
potentially expensive to
maintain competitive
edge; does not alter
ecosystem service
profile
Lock-in of Status Exclusive agricultural Maintains agricultural Politically controversial
Quo Agricultural use zoning districts; land uses if zoning used; does not
Use purchase of alter ecosystem service
development rights profile; restricts land
(e.g., PDR/PACE market
programs)
Agricultural Use Command-and-control Maintains agricultural Potentially undermines
with Increased regulation mandate of land uses; reduces financial stability of
Environmental best management environmental harms; agricultural uses by
Performance practices; incentives possible shift of increasing compliance
Baseline such as subsidies and ecosystem service costs and reducing
tax relief; possibly also profile toward production potential;
zoning regulating and requires new
supporting services managerial skills;
politically
controversial; requires
more regulatory
infrastructure;
expensive if incentives
are used; could prompt
conversions to
development scenarios
if exclusive agricultural
use zoning not also used
Transformation to Payment for Maintains some Possible reduction in
Multifunctional environmental agricultural land uses; food and fiber
Working Landscape services; transferable likely to increase open production; requires
development rights; space and associated public expenditures for
pollutant trading ecosystem services; PES (potentially offset
programs; certification likely to significantly by cost savings);
programs; planned unit shift ecosystem service requires new
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development zoning profile toward managerial skills;
for any areas being regulating and possible increased
developed supporting services; density of development
requires only moderate within community if
use of regulation transferable
development rights are
used
Conversion to Open Purchase of Eliminates Expensive; loss of
Space conservation easement environmental harms; agricultural land;
with enforceable terms nonregulatory; reduction in food and
or fee simple title with responds to land fiber production;
deed restrictions market; likely to restricts future land
significantly shift market if terms or
ecosystem service restrictions are
profile toward comprehensive and
regulating and permanent
supporting services
Conversion to New Planned unit Responds to land Loss of rural and
Urbanism Mixed- development zoning; market; likely to agricultural land;
Use, Mixed-Density transferable increase open space reduction in food and
Development development rights and associated fiber production; loss of
ecosystem services; opportunity to enhance
promotes affordability ecosystem service
of housing stock flows; increased fiscal
and infrastructure
demands on local
community
Conversion to Conventional uniform, Responds to land Loss of rural and
Uniform Low- low-density residential market; promotes agricultural land;
Density district zoning affordability of reduction in food and
Development housing stock fiber production; loss of
opportunity to enhance
ecosystem service
flows; increased fiscal
and infrastructure
demands on local
community
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II. DESIGNING PES AND TDR PROGRAMS FOR AGRICULTURAL
ECOSYSTEM SERVICES-CASE STUDIES FROM FLORIDA
Because of their potentially prominent role in encouraging the
conversion of conventional farming to multifunctional agricultural
land uses, this section focuses on the use of PES and TDR
programs built around ecosystem service values. The two
approaches share several general design features in addition to
presenting their respective characteristics and differences. If
appropriately designed and managed, however, PES and TDR
programs can contribute significantly to state and local policies
designed to enhance farm multifunctionality.
A. General Design Issues
Promoting the shift from conventional farming to
multifunctional farming, particularly when incentives are used to
enhance delivery of regulating services to surrounding
communities as a primary goal, presents a number of threshold
design issues for the managing jurisdiction regardless of the
incentive mechanism. First, the baseline expectations of
agricultural land uses must be defined so that the managing
jurisdiction can identify when providing incentives is
appropriate.54 As noted previously, the regulatory baseline for
agriculture has been set quite low, meaning farmers have relatively
high expectations for when they deserve incentives to "push" them
toward improved performance. An incentive program could be
designed, however, to leave a performance gap between the
regulatory baseline and the performance levels that trigger
eligibility for incentives, providing a "pull" toward a more realistic
baseline before the push of incentives encourages even more
improvement. In either approach, the managing jurisdiction must
form a clear understanding of existing agricultural practices, the
desired practices (e.g., riparian buffers, wetland recharge features,
native vegetation open space), and performance levels that trigger
incentives.
Next, the goal of enhancing regulating ecosystem services
should be based on a known present or expected future demand
that can be assigned a value with reasonable geographic and
economic specificity. Where are the expected ecosystem services
14 See Even, supra note 15, at 197.
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likely to produce benefits, in what form, and how valuable are they
in present and expected future land use scenarios within the
jurisdiction? These are macro-level questions that require
assessment of the potential capacity of existing and restored
natural capital on the target agricultural lands, the present and
future configuration of land uses in the managing jurisdiction, and
the geographic match between the two. Valuation of the ecosystem
service flows then can be based on expected avoided costs-e.g.,
tle cost savings of avoided flood control or recharge capital
expenditures; the avoided costs of flood and drought damages.
55
Comprehensive jurisdiction-wide inventories of natural and built
capital will be needed, as will well-conceived future land use
planning projections, both of which will necessarily rely heavily
on geographic information system (GIS) modeling.
With the demand side analysis in place, a supply side
assessment also is necessary to identify the most effective and
efficient incentive distribution. In all likelihood, the agricultural
lands identified as having the capacity to enhance ecosystem
service values will be divided under numerous owners. Yet the
delivery of ecosystem services off the landscape is unlikely to be
linear and proportionate, such that securing ten percent of the
targeted lands will yield ten percent of the ecosystem services.
Natural capital might provide services that substitute for the
services technological capital provides, but natural capital is an
ecological resource that behaves according to complex ecosystem
properties.
For example, the connections between ecological resources
and the delivery of ecosystem service benefits to human
populations is known, in many contexts to operate at landscape
levels, to involve an array of ecological attributes, and to behave in
nonlinear relationships over space and time.56 This raises the
difficult question of how precisely to define the proxy for natural
55 Assigning these values is a major research effort today among agricultural
economists. See John M. Antle & Jetse J. Stoorvogel, Predicting the Supply of
Ecosystem Services from Agriculture, 88 AM. J. AGRIC. ECON. 1174, 1174
(2006).
56 See, e.g., Edward B. Barbier et al., Coastal Ecosystem-Based Management
with Nonlinear Ecological Functions and Values, 319 SCIENCE 321, 321 (2008)
(demonstrating that wave attenuation benefits of coastal wetlands do not respond
linearly to surface area of the wetlands). The complex relationship between
ecological resources and ecosystem service values is explored in RUHL, KRAFT &
LANT, supra note 10, at 15-35.
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capital the program is designed to maintain and for which the
incentive is paid or doled out.57 For example, is it any riparian
habitat, or does the type and density of vegetation matter?58
Moreover, securing ten percent of the natural capital capacity of
the targeted agricultural lands might produce zero improvement in
ecological service flows-it might take half of the targeted natural
capital enhancements before the jurisdiction realizes any
measurable ecosystem service benefits. In that event, providing
incentives to cover anything less than half the resources, while it
would secure ecological resources, would not have the desired
ecosystem service value payoff. Incentive programs thus must be
carefully designed to correspond with the ecological properties of
the targeted natural capital resources on a landscape level first,
from which incentives can be provided to specific parcel owners in
a coordinated manner.
Finally, any incentive system designed to enhance targeted
regulating ecosystem services must account for the larger physical
and political systems in which it is operating. Aligning farmer
incentives to provide, say, increased wetland recharge resources or
riparian habitat necessarily imposes some trade-offs both
ecologically and economically. Those trade-offs must be
recognized and considered. Also, other land use and farm policies
must be considered. Will the retention of agricultural land and
open space have impacts on the stock of affordable housing in the
jurisdiction? Are federal farm policies competing with state and
local incentive programs, making it difficult. for the one or the
other set of incentives to gain traction? 59 The point is simply that
the program, even assuming it has been thought through with
respect to baseline performance expectations and the demand for
and supply of services, must be integrated into the larger picture
and its consequences and conflicts fully considered.
57 Jack et al. note that "when marginal benefits from service provision are not
constant, more complex incentive schemes are needed to achieve environmental
effectiveness." Jack, Kousky & Sims, supra note 16, at 9466.
58 See Francisco Alpizar, Allen Blackman & Alexinder Pfaff, Payments for
Ecosystem Services: Why Precision and Targeting Matter, RESOURCES, Spring
2007, at 20, 20-21.
59 See Jack, Kousky & Sims, supra note 16, at 9467 (discussing the potential
for different incentive and subsidy programs to work at cross purposes).
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B. Designing Agricultural PES Programs-The Florida
Ranchlands Environmental Services Project
Assuming a jurisdiction has a firm handle on the general
design issues outlined above, the choice of a PES program presents
additional considerations. For example, the Florida Ranchlands
Environmental Services Project (FRESP), launched in 2005 by the
World Wildlife Fund (WWF) and private and public partners, is a
pilot PES program designed to pay ranchers in an 850,000-acre
area of central Florida to enhance delivery of three regulating
ecosystem services-water retention, phosphorous load reduction,
and wetlands habitat expansion.60 The target area is located north
of Lake Okeechobee, with cow-calf operations as the dominant
agricultural land use. A 2004 study WWF conducted for state
agencies 6' concluded that changing water management practices in
the ranchlands could be a cost-effective alternative to regional
water treatment facilities in moderating water flows and
phosphorous loads to lake Okeechobee. 62 Most significantly, the
study demonstrated that "the agencies could buy these services
from cattle ranchers at a lower cost than producing the services by
building new public works projects. 63 And the ranchers could be
better off as well:
Under the program, ranchers will sell environmental services to
agencies of the state and other willing buyers. The public will
benefit when services are provided at a lower cost than can be
secured from public investment in regional water storage and
water treatment facilities. And ranchers, who face low profit
margins and fluctuations in the price of beef, will be provided
with another source of income, creating a financial incentive for
60 See Sarah Lynch & Leonard Shabman, The Florida Ranchlands
Environmental Services Project: Field Testing a Pay-for-Environmental-Services
Program, RESOURCES, Spring 2007, 17, 17. Funding for the three-year FRESP
pilot study is $2.3 million from the USDA, Florida Department of Agriculture,
and South Florida Water Management District, plus an additional $2 million
from the State of Florida. See Memorandum from Deena Reppen, Director,
Office of Government and Public Affairs, to South Florida Water Management
District Governing Board Members, re FRESP (Aug. 6, 2007) (on file with
author); WWF ET AL., FRESP: LAKE OKEECHOBEE WATERSHED,
http://www.archbold-station.org/abs/maerc/MAERC%20docs/FL%2OEnviro%20
Ser%20Project one%20piger.pdf (last visited Sept. 24, 2008).
61 See SARAH LYNCH ET AL., ASSESSING ON-RANCH PROVISION OF WATER
MANAGEMENT ENVIRONMENTAL SERVICES (June 2005) (on file with journal).
62 See Lynch & Shabman, supra note 60, at 17.
63 Id.
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land to remain in ranching rather than be converted to more
intensive agriculture and urban development-land uses that
will further aggravate water flow, pollution, and habitat
problems. 64
Hence, whereas WWF might normally have targeted
payments from its limited funds for wildlife habitat conservation,
the idea behind the program is to identify cost savings to local
jurisdictions and state agencies that make paying for ecosystem
services an efficient expenditure of public resources, with the
incidental benefit of increased wildlife habitat conservation.
Nevertheless, design issues identified in the report led WWF
and its partners to test the concept through the FRESP pilot
program involving eight ranches. Chief among these issues is the
method of documenting that the payment has produced the benefit,
which requires finding the right "trade-off between the cost of
documentation and the accuracy of measurements that is
acceptable to buyers and sellers. 65 So, for example, the water
retention service payments will pay ranchers to rehydrate drained
wetlands and raise the height of the water table in the ranch soil
profile and drainage network, and remote instruments will monitor
data on rainfall, water stages, and flow, allowing a before-and-after
comparison. 66 Once this relationship between changed ranching
practices and enhanced service flows is identified, measuring on-
site changes in ranching practices can provide the pricing proxy for
ecosystem service enhancement and the documentation to support
buyer confidence. In short, any PES program must devise a way
for the buyer and seller to know that payment X yields service
value Y, and that this is a rational economic move for both
67parties.
64 Id. at 18.
65 Id.
66 See id. at 18-19. The FRESP pilot study was initiated in 2006. However,
severe drought in 2007 limited the collection of data and no conclusions have
been drawn yet as to these critical relationships. Interview with Sarah Lynch,
Program Director, WWF FRESP (Feb. 5, 2008).
67 This design need, as well as other economic aspects of PES design, is
covered in more detail in Antle, supra note 17, at 13-17.
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C. Designing Agricultural TDRs for Ecosystem Service
Enhancement-The Florida Rural Lands Stewardship Act
Relatively new to agricultural settings 68 and showing only
limited success thus far,69 farmland TDR programs are for the most
part constructed around an "old agriculture" model-one based
largely on preserving farm "character 70 and which neither
recognizes nor promotes farmland multifunctionality.71 Jesse
Richardson's compact and insightful analysis of agricultural TDR
programs 72 identifies several design challenges that have grown
out of this experience. First, and most obviously, the program
depends on supply of and demand for the TDRs. Neither is as easy
to make happen as it seems. Agricultural "senders" need to view
the TDR as more attractive than either their conventional
agriculture or "last harvest" options, and there must be
"communities willing to accept designation as a receiving area for
higher-density development. 73 Even when the supply and demand
communities are identified as willing in principle to engage in the
transaction, the balance between the two is delicate. By contrast to
PES, the "market" for TDRs is a regulatory construct, not a true
market, and thus depends on some finely tuned government
intervention to make demand in the receiving area strong and the
supply of the TDRs just right to keep them valuable in that market.
If too many development rights are created or if the incentives
in the receiving areas are insufficient, the price of the
development rights will be too low.... If not enough
development rights are distributed or if the incentives in the
receiving areas. are too great, the price of development rights
68 See JUERGENSMEYER & ROBERTS, supra note 9, § 13.11 at 860 ("[T]he
application of the transferable development approach to agricultural land use
preservation is of relatively recent origin.").
69 See LINCOLN INST. OF LAND POLICY, TRANSFER OF DEVELOPMENT RIGHTS
FOR BALANCED DEVELOPMENT 3-5 (May 1998) (suggesting that, outside of a few
success stories, "the overall picture is ambiguous"), available at
http://pb.state.ny.us/pbc/conference_9805_transferdevelopment.pdf; Jesse J.
Richardson, Jr., Goldilocks, the Three Bears and Transfer of Development
Rights, AGRIC. L. UPDATE, Dec. 2006, at 4 (noting that only eight of twenty-three
farmland preservation TDR programs active in 2004 protected more than 1,000
acres).
70 See Rick Pruetz & Erica Pruetz, Transfer of Development Rights Turns 40,
59 PLAN. & DEV. L. 3, 5 (2007).
71 See Richardson, supra note 69, at 5-6.
72 See id.
71 Id. at 4-5.
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will be very high.... The number of development rights and
the incentives for both sides must be "just right."74
But getting that part right is just the beginning. Housing
markets fluctuate and cross local political boundaries. How will a
local TDR "coordinate and collaborate with other local
governments in the region" to keep a handle on those trends?
75
Farmers that sell TDRs cannot sell to developers, but might not
necessarily stay in active farming. "No one has investigated
whether these programs actually promote and aid farm
production. 76 And if the TDR program is aimed at rewarding
farmers for conserving environmental values, how are those values
calculated in sending areas and then converted into density
development rights in receiving areas? How many apples get you
so many oranges? Based on these challenges, Richardson
concludes that "the theoretical beauty of TDR 'programs lures
many to the tool. However, the complexity makes implementation
difficulty."
77
"Although Richardson's assessment of agricultural TDR
programs is a sobering reminder that the simple elegance of TDR
theory ultimately gives way to the utter complexity of their
implementation, some states have forged ahead with what could be
promising structural advances, particularly with respect to
enhancing the delivery of ecosystem services. For example, in
2001 the Florida Legislature enacted the Rural Land Stewardship
Act (RLSA),78 which allows counties to designate all or portions of
agricultural and rural lands in the jurisdiction as a rural land
stewardship (RLS) area. Within RLS areas, the local government
applies planning and economic incentives consistent with
guidelines to be developed by the Florida Department of
Community Affairs (DCA) to encourage the implementation of
innovative and flexible planning and development strategies and
creative land use planning techniques, with TDRs as the primary
policy mechanism.
71 Id. at 6.
71 See id. at 4.
76 Id. at 5.
77 Id. at 6.
's FLA. STAT. § 163.3177(1 1)(d) (2008). For background on the legislative
purpose and amendment history of RLSA, see DEP'T OF URBAN & REG'L
PLANNING, FLA. STATE UNIV., RURAL LAND STEWARDSHIP 2007 ANNUAL
REPORT 1-4 (2007).
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1. Structure and Goals
Like any TDR-based program, RLS areas contain
"stewardship sending areas" within which natural resources and
rural land values are conserved, and "receiving areas" within
which development is authorized to occur, with the TDR linking
the two areas. 79 A landowner who conserves rural and natural
resource values in the sending area accrues "stewardship credits"
entitling the landowner to TDRs, known in RLSA parlance as
transferable rural land use credits, allowing greater development
densities in receiving areas than would apply under the otherwise
applicable zoning rules. 80 These credits
may be assigned at different ratios of credits per acre according
to the natural resource or other beneficial use characteristics of
the land and according to the land use remaining following the
transfer of credits, with the highest number of credits per acre
assigned to the most environmentally valuable lands or, in
locations where the retention of open space and agricultural
land is a priority, to such lands.
8 1
RLSA stands apart from most TDR programs in two respects.
First, it is entirely voluntary on the credit generating side. Most
TDR programs, particularly those focused on historic and
environmental preservation, regulate activities in the sending area
and provide TDRs as the purported quid-pro-quo.82
Understandably, this leads to resentment among the landowners
regulated in the receiving area who receive what they may believe
is inadequate value in the TDR to compensate for the lost
development potential, even so far as to frequently lead to takings
claims.8 3 By contrast, RLSA uses TDRs purely as an incentive to
alter land use practices and deter conversion to suburban
development in the sending area.
Second, RLSA strikes a chord very close to the farm
multifunctionality theme. The statute specifies six goals that must
be served by creation and operation of a RLS area: (1) restoration
79 FLA. STAT. § 163.3177(11)(d)(4).
80 Id.
8" Id. § (d)(6)j).
82 See Juergensmeyer, Nicholas & Leebrick, supra note 18, at 448-55
(surveying several prominent programs).
83 See Andrew J. Miller, Transferable Development Rights in the
Constitutional Landscape: Has Penn Central Failed to Weather the Storm?, 39
NAT. RESOURCES J. 459, 459 (1999).
Imaged with Permission from N.Y.U. Environmental Law Journal
[Volume 17
HeinOnline  -- 17 N.Y.U. Envtl. L.J. 450 2008-2009
AGRICULTURE AND ECOSYSTEM SERVICES
and maintenance of the economic value of rural land; (2) control of
urban sprawl; (3) identification and protection of ecosystems,
habitats, and natural resources; (4) promotion of rural economic
activity; (5) maintenance of the viability of Florida's agricultural
economy; and (6) protection of the character of rural areas of
Florida.84 These goals evidence an advance in thinking beyond
prior practice in agricultural TDRs. On its face at least, RLSA thus
is more than a farmland status quo or cultural amenity preservation
program-it focuses on providing incentives tied to the economic
value of rural land and natural resources integrated within working
landscapes.
Nevertheless, although the credit generating side of RLSA is
nonregulatory and innovatively ties in the concept of economic
value of rural lands, the credit consumption side has the look and
feel of conventional TDR programs in that it relies on a default
rule for development density and units that can be exceeded
through purchase of credits. Hence, in addition to the agriculture
and ecosystem service design issues mentioned already generally
and for PES programs, RLSA left many land use policy and
implementation questions unanswered. For example: What is the
appropriate methodology for identifying and designing
development in receiving areas? How is demand for RLSA land
use credits maintained in the receiving area? What is it that land
use credits are "buying" in the way of number of units, density of
development, mixed uses, and so on?
85
Before the DCA had developed guidelines addressing these
and related issues, two RLS areas had been established--one just
under 200,000 acres in Collier County, which includes the new
town of Ave Maria in its receiving area, and St. Lucie County's
22,000-acre RLS area encompassing the Adam's Ranch-and
many others were in planning.86 Clearly, demand for the RLSA
program was strong in Florida. To catch the RLSA train before it
had left the station at full steam, therefore, in April 2007 the
84 FLA. STAT. § 163.3177(11)(d)(2).
85 A brainstorming session I had with DCA staff in the spring of 2007
developed a long list of such issues, which focus primarily on land use in the
receiving area and thus are outside the scope of this work. See also NATHANIEL
REED, CHAIRMAN EMERITUS, 1000 FRIENDS OF FLORIDA, WORKING TO SUSTAIN
FLORIDA'S RURAL AND NATURAL LANDS: A CALL TO ACTION 10-11 (2007);
Letter from Charles Pattison et al. to the Honorable Thomas Pelham, Secretary,
Florida Department of Community Affairs 2-5 (June 6, 2007).
86 See DEP'T OF URBAN & REG'L PLANNING, supra note 78, at 6-8.
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Secretary of the DCA delivered a letter to one of the counties
planning a RLS area desVnation to "inform the County of the
process the Department will use in considering and authorizing
RLSA proposals. 87 Since then, the DCA has initiated a
rulemaking to develop comprehensive RLSA guidelines and has
conducted several workshops to identify stakeholder interests and
input.
88
2. Integrating Ecosystem Services into the RLSA Framework
Although RLSA makes no specific mention of farm
multifunctionality or farm provision of ecosystem services, the
statute's multi-factored goals-set clearly opens the door to
organizing RLS areas and TDRs around those principles. For
example, integrating ecosystem service production capacity into
the stewardship credit calculus would support and reward the
"restoration and maintenance of the economic value of rural land"
and contribute to the "promotion of rural economic activity."
Providing farms a means of capitalizing on their production of
regulating services would contribute to the "maintenance of the
viability of Florida's agricultural economy." Providing incentives
to conserve the agricultural land capital producing those services
would "support the identification and protection of ecosystems,
habitats, and natural resources," and the consequence of doing all
of the foregoing could only contribute to the "control of urban
sprawl" and the "protection of the character of rural areas of
Florida." The fit between RLSA and the farm multifunctionality
movement thus seems as tight as a glove.
Moreover, by linking the value of the TDR to ecosystem
service production, RLSA would test the farm stewardship
claim-the better the stewarding for the greater community, the
more value in the TDR. This approach thus makes the trade-off
between provisioning and regulating services explicit and
transparent. To the extent the TDR contains an increment of value
clearly attributable to provision of regulating services, farmers in
RLS areas can evaluate the consequences of emphasizing
87 Letter from Thomas G. Pelham, Secretary of the Florida Department of
Community Affairs, to The Honorable C. Guy Maxcy, Chairman, Highlands
County Board of Commissioners 1 (Apr. 4, 2007) (on file with journal).
88 These developments can be followed on DCA's Rural Land Stewardship
Act website, http://www.dca.state.fl.us/fdcp/dcp/RuralLandStewardship/
index.cfm (last visited Sept. 24, 2008).
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continued commodity production over conservation of agricultural
land capital capable of supplying regulating services to
surrounding communities. The scale of the RLSA program, if so
configured, would operate from local to national, as TDR values
could reflect services such as local groundwater recharge to global
carbon sequestration. Finally, although the state oversees RLSA,
ultimately the creation and operation of RLS areas will be locally
demand-driven.
Indeed, as part of its RLSA rulemaking process, the DCA
commissioned the Florida Planning and Development Laboratory
at Florida State University (FSU Laboratory) to prepare a RLSA
program evaluation study.89 The final report from that study
recognizes the importance of integrating ecosystem services in the
RLSA TDR calculus. In particular, two of RLSA's goals-
restoration and maintenance of the economic value of rural land
and the identification and protection of ecosystems, habitats, and
natural resources-invite attention to ecosystem service values
farms can provide. The FSU Laboratory's final report90 thus
identifies "captur[ing] the value of environmental services" as one
of the "core principles" of successful agriculture TDR programs:
Successful programs are those that account not only for the
aesthetic aspects of agricultural land but also for environmental
services agricultural lands provide. These would include the
provisioning of non-land resources, like water, and the land's
participation in environmental regulation processes (like water
purification) that would have to be otherwise acquired in the
marketplace.
91
To ensure that these values are "captured" in a way that
properly aligns incentives toward farm multifunctionality, the FSU
Laboratory suggested several program evaluation indicator metrics
for RLS areas that focus on ecosystem service values. One such
indicator appears in connection with the goal of restoration and
maintenance of the economic value of rural land:
Indicator 1.3. Environmental service values delivered by rural
lands in sending areas are reflected in the RLSA system.
Metric 1.3.1. Stewardship credits reflect the value of conserved
89 I served on the panel of experts the FSU Laboratory formed to provide
input and to critique early drafts of the report.
90 See TIM CHAPIN & HARRISON HIGGINS, RURAL LAND STEWARDSHIP AREAS
(RLSA) PROGRAM EVALUATION FRAMEWORK (2007) (on file with journal).
91 Id. at 13.
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environmental services that are bought and sold outside of the
RLS program.
Metric 1.3.2. The stewardship credit system provides market
incentives to maintain and enhance capacity of rural lands in
sending areas to provide environmental services and to monitor
the provision of those services.
Metric 1.3.3. Economic values of rural lands in sending areas
are enhanced by the use of environmental service values in
RLSA system.
9 2
The other appears under the goal of identifying and protecting
ecosystems, habitats, and natural resources:
Indicator 3.5. The capacity for rural lands in stewardship
sending areas to provide, maintain, and enhance environmental
services is enhanced, as measured by
Metric 3.5.1. Delivery and value of environmental services
within the potential and approved stewardship sending areas.
93
The FSU Laboratory report did not go further in outlining
how to design RLSA implementation to accomplish these goals. In
particular, unlike the FRESP PES program, the RLSA TDR
program involves two interrelated pricing decisions, the
relationship between which is not a market-based outcome. As
structured, RLSA can be thought of as an accounting mechanism
that correlates the public benefits of enhanced ecosystem services
in sending areas with the public impacts of increased density in
receiving areas. On the one hand, therefore, like a PES program,
the RLSA program must calibrate the award of credits to the value
of the ecosystem services being delivered through altered land
uses. In addition, however, RLSA implementation requires a
method for controlling the value of the TDR credits in the
receiving areas, as that provides the financial basis for the
incentive in sending areas to change land use practices. But it is
the value of enhanced land development opportunities, not the
enhanced ecosystem services, that drives TDR values in the
receiving areas. Balancing these two markets when there is no
market-based way of equating a development opportunity in one
market with an ecosystem service value in the other market
presents the difficult "apples for oranges" conversion calibration
for RLSA.
92 Id. at 15.
9' Id. at 19.
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It may be necessary for local jurisdictions to develop proxies
for keeping the exchange between the two markets in synch. For
example, based on the macro-analysis of natural capital potential
in the jurisdiction and the present and expected jurisdictional land
uses, it may be possible to define TDR premiums assigned to
different sets J of agricultural land practices and conservation
measures that enhance ecosystem service flows above a defined
baseline. A conservation easement might define the standard
credit, and restoration of riparian habitat might earn a set premium.
For ongoing agricultural land uses, preservation of the status quo
use might define the standard credit, and sets of management and
restoration practices-the silver, gold, and platinum levels, so to
speak-might be used to define levels of premiums. 94 For lands
moved into conservation status, premiums above the reward for
simple open space could be based on the qualitatively described
connection between measurable geographic (e.g., acreage of
wetlands), service (e.g., flood protection), demographic (e.g.,
benefited population), and economic (e.g., replacement value to
the benefitted built environment) factors, even if precise
quantification is not possible. While these or other proxies might
not precisely calibrate ecosystem service benefits with
development density impacts, RLSA provides an accounting
mechanism that is more transparent and planned than a trade-off
negotiated between landowners and local governments as part of a
zoning decision.
Leaving ecosystem services out of the RLSA framework will
render RLSA an "old agriculture" program that continues to drive
farming toward the production of commodities and rural character,
with the provision of regulating services to surrounding
communities an accidental and incidental benefit which farmers.
will view, if at all, as a positive externality for which they receive
nothing in return. On the other hand, the design issues identified
above suggest it will be difficult to fashion general formulae for
integrating ecosystem services into specific local settings. Indeed,
in its proposed RLSA rule,95 not yet finalized as of this writing,
DCA did little to put the ecosystem services concept in play,
though it left the door open to RLSA initiatives to do so. For
94 I thank Katrina Wyman in particular for this suggestion.
95 See FLA. DEP'T OF CMTY. AFFAIRS, SECOND DRAFT RURAL LAND
STEWARDSHIP AREAS RULE (2008), available at http://www.dca.state.fl.us/fdcp/
dcp/RuralLandStewardship/Second Draft-RLSARule.pdf.
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example, under the proposal, land values analysis for purposes of
the credit system must consider "[a]ll forms of rural resources
including agricultural, environmental, local and regional
ecosystems, wildlife habitat, [and] water resources," as well as
"[t]he broad landscape ecology including geographic linkages and
corridors". 96 While this does not mandate incorporation of
ecosystem service values in the TDR credit system, it
unquestionably allows it. For local jurisdictions wishing to do so,
the recommendations of the FSU Laboratory provide useful
guidelines.
D. Matching PES and TDR Programs with Context
One unmistakable theme from the preceding sections is that,
by comparison, PES programs are simple and TDR programs are
complex. A PES program is in essence simply a market exchange
bringing willing buyers and sellers together, providing the
information and market monitoring and enforcement both parties
need to enter confidently into transactions.
Of course, that is the trick with ecosystem services-finding
buyers and sellers who can exchange in a market. The FRESP has
that good fortune. Motivated by the strong national and state desire
to improve water quality in the Everglades and to manage water
resources better in central Florida, FRESP has seized on a golden
opportunity to match demand for and supply of ecosystem
services. In rural agricultural areas distant from populated service
demand markets, however, PES programs will often consist of
sellers without buyers. Even where urbanization is expected over
time, a PES program may lack public and private buyer resources
to secure ecosystem services today for the urban populations of the
future.
By contrast, TDR programs require no public expenditure to
generate credits, though by all means they depend on demand for
urban development to make the credits valuable. By appropriately
placing receiving areas closer to the urbanizing fringe, however,
TDR programs such as RLSA may be able to leverage demand for
development into demand for credits, thereby promoting
enhancement of ecosystem service flows sooner than would be the
case under a PES program. Moreover, because a RLSA program is
tied closely to a local jurisdiction's future land use plan, the
96 Id. at 7.
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jurisdiction is more likely to appreciate the long term need for
ecosystem service "green" infrastructure and view the TDR trade-
off between development and conservation as a worthy
investment. In other words, allowing more development to secure
enhanced ecosystem service flows may be a better option for a
local jurisdiction than less development with degraded ecosystem
services flows.
The point is that PES and TDR programs are different, and as
such may be suited to different contexts. A summary of some of
those differences is provided in the following chart:
PES TDRS
Advantages Provides opportunity for public No expenditure of public resources
capital infrastructure cost savings; required for creation of credits;
based purely on market incentives; provides opportunity for public
can be applied at large scales capital infrastructure cost savings;
where regional ecosystem services receiving area can be positioned near
are valued; simple by comparison market demand for development
while sending area can be rural; value
of credits can be managed through
regulation of receiving areas and kept
sufficiently high to deter conversion
to development
Disadvantages Requires expenditure from public Requires regulation in receiving area;
(or private) resources; less likely to results in increased development and
be viable in rural areas where no -costs associated with resulting
immediate market exists for the demand on public infrastructure;
services; payments may not be depends on active development
sufficient to deter conversion to market demand in receiving area;
development scenarios; requires requires new managerial skills
new managerial skills
Major Design Issues Deciding the baseline expected All of the PES design issues plus:
performance levels of agricultural managing supply and demand
land uses; identifying the equilibrium between the sending and
economic values of the enhanced receiving markets; setting conversion
ecosystem services and their rates between enhanced ecosystem
pathways of delivery; downscaling service values and development rights
macro-level to parcel-level; in receiving areas; meeting fiscal and
calibrating altered land use infrastructure demands imposed by
practices with enhanced ecosystem the increased development rights in
service flows; documenting the receiving areas
altered management practices
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CONCLUSION
Robert Wolcott recently aptly described the threshold at
which American farm policy finds itself:
Agriculture occupies the high ground of comparative advantage
in supplying socially demanded, low-cost ecosystem services.
Agriculture is accustomed to publicly funded incentives, and
private markets to signal supply value sought by society
whether corn, soybeans, or wildlife habitat. The level and
composition of the demand side is increasingly evident, though
in flux as well .... The prospect of broad-scale compensation of
agricultural producers for supplying ecosystem services is
real.97
The question is whether federal, state, and local farm policy
will seize this opportunity. Can the Farm Bill ever break out of its
commodity support/land retirement mold? Will federal, state, and
local policy converge on the vision of farms as multifunctional
production units? This Article has made the case that state and
local policy, through PES, TDR, and similar techniques, can have
a significant role to play in moving toward that vision.
Federal farm policy should encourage and support such state
and local initiatives, as it is in the national interest to maintain and
enhance the natural capital that agricultural lands contain and can
deliver locally across the landscape. Measures Congress might
take include:
" Fund research to determine how to calibrate farm practices
with ecosystem service delivery at local scales, as USDA
has done with FRESP.
0 Develop national standards for quantifying. ecosystem
service values associated with agricultural lands, including
the development of proxies that can inexpensively be
measured to estimate service delivery potential
* Give preference in federal "green subsidy" payments
programs for farms that would actually deliver ecosystem
service values to identifiable local and regional populations
* Fund pilot and permanent demand-based state and local
farm multifunctionality programs such as FRESP
The 2008 Farm Bill took a modest step in this direction.
97 Robert M. Wolcott, Prospects for Ecosystem Services in the Future
Agricultural Economy: Reflections of a Policy Hand, 88 AM. J. AGRIc. ECON.
1181, 1182-83 (2006).
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Section 2709 of the Food, Conservation, and Energy Act of 2008
requires the Department of Agriculture to "establish technical
guidelines that outline science-based methods to measure the
environmental services benefits from conservation and land
management activities in order to facilitate the participation of
farmers, ranchers, and forest landowners in emerging
environmental services markets" and to establish guidelines to
develop a procedure to measure environmental services benefits, a
protocol to report environmental services benefits, and a registry to
collect, record and maintain the benefits measured.98 Ideally, the
agency will develop procedures and protocols that are relevant to
state and local efforts such as RLSA and FRESP, as well as to
other federal regulatory land management agencies, thereby
promoting national uniformity of standards.
Conventional agriculture is at a crossroads, facing pressure to
improve its environmental performance profile at the same time it
is facing pressure to produce more food, fiber, and fuel
commodities on the one hand or to give way to urban development
on the other. In the best of all worlds, markets would fully
recognize the value of ecosystem service flows and farms could
make appropriate balances between providing services,
commodities, or land development opportunities. But hoping for
this seems quixotic, as markets have proven time and again to be
poor at valuing the multifunctional capacity of ecological
landscapes.
Understanding the multifunctional capacity of agricultural
lands, however, provides insight into how state and local
governments, with federal guidance and support, could promote
alternatives that blend enhanced environmental performance with
better development planning. RLSA and FRESP could become
model farm policy programs in this respect, or they could recede
into the ways of "old agriculture." Whatever their future, however,
it is promising to find state and local governments beginning to act
strategically to influence the future scenarios of existing
agricultural land uses notwithstanding the substantial design
challenges these techniques face.
98 Food, Conservation & Energy Act of 2008, H.R. 2419, 110th Cong. §
2709 (2008).
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